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The potentially chilling effects of non-compete covenants on the ambitions and capacities of 
former employees to forge careers as commercial entrepreneurs have been propelled to the 
forefront of public debate in recent years. For example, in the US, reports in the press of rank 
and file employees working in sandwich bars being restrained by post-employment 
restrictions have sparked outrage. Nor has public debate in the UK been immune to such 
concerns. For example, the British Government has issued a call for evidence and a separate 
consultation paper on the future of non-compete covenants. The emphasis in these papers has 
been on versing the possible adverse consequences of non-compete covenants for the public 
good, the wider economy and social policy. Taking these ideas in the Government’s work as 
its point of departure, the concepts of the public interest and economic power are evoked in 
this article. Ultimately, the claim is made that in deciding whether to enforce non-compete 
covenants, the courts should afford greater significance to the public interest in the current 
incarnation of the common law restraint of trade doctrine. And this calls for a much livelier 
sense of the economic power that such covenants enable employers to exploit in the labour 
market, as well as the resultant social costs imposed on the public, consumers and society. 
 
Keywords 
Law, Economics, Restrictive Covenants, Labour Law, Employment Law, Doctrine in Restraint 
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Regulating Restrictive Covenants in English Employment Law: Time for a Rethink? 
David Cabrelli, University of Edinburgh 
 
1. Introduction 
Although employment relationships are characterised by both inequality of bargaining power 
and employee subordination to the employer, the common law has clung to the fiction that the 
parties are formally equal and that it should play a neutral role.1 The received wisdom is that 
protective legislation and collective bargaining are necessary institutions, designed to offset or 
dilute these two key features characteristic of the employment relationship. But the eminent 
British labour lawyer Kahn-Freund2 understood very well that there were limits to the common 
law’s adherence to formal neutrality in the case of the contract of employment. He realised that 
there was one significant isolated situation where the courts would harness the common law to 
‘lift the veil of [formal] equality and to allow the fact of subordination to impinge upon the 
validity of [the contract of employment]’.3 And that instance was in the case of the doctrine of 
                                                 
 I would like to thank Alberto Brown, Karen McGill and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments 
on the drafts of this paper. 
1 KAHN-FREUND’S LABOUR AND THE LAW 14-18 (Paul Davies & Mark Freedland eds., 1983). For the 
reasons that the courts generally cleave to the notion that the parties are formally free and equal in contracting, 
see Aditi Bagchi, The Myth of Equality in the Employment Relation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 579, 580-587 
(2009).  
2 Otto Kahn-Freund was a German émigré from Nazi Germany: see MARK FREEDLAND, Otto Kahn-Freund 
(1900-1979), in JURISTS UPROOTED 299 (Jack Beatson & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2004) and Ruth 
Dukes, Otto Kahn-Freund and Collective Laissez-Faire: An Edifice without a Keystone? 72, No.2 MOD. L. 
REV. 220 (2009).  
3 KAHN-FREUND’S LABOUR AND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 35-36. See also Frank Carrigan & Peter 
Radan, The Post-Employment Restraint of Trade Doctrine: A Critical History, 31 K.L.J. 121, 122 (2020). As 
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restraint of trade, where the common law would be deployed as a means of protecting the 
employee from onerous restrictive covenants – which are essentially express contractual terms 
in the employee’s employment contract prohibiting them from working for a competing 
business of the employer after the termination of the employment contract. More tellingly, 
however, the policy for doing so is not the inequality of bargaining power existing in the 
employment relationship, but instead, the freedom of the employee to trade and the interest of 
the public in ‘preventing employees from depriving themselves of their freedom to compete’.4 
Seen from this perspective, somewhat surprisingly, non-compete restrictive covenants are 
regulated by the restraint of trade doctrine despite – rather than because of – the inequality of 
bargaining power5 lying at the heart of the employment relationship.6 And the foundation for 
that common law intervention was and is the protection of liberty, competition and trade. 
                                                 
such, this was a recognition that formal equality should yield to a more substantive form of equality: for the 
distinction between formal equality and substantive equality see Avihay Dorfman, Private Law Exceptionalism: 
Part II: A Basic Difficulty with the Argument from Formal Equality, 31 CAN. J.L. JURIS. 5 (2018).  
4 KAHN-FREUND’S LABOUR AND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 35-36. 
5 This is consistent with general principles of English contract law, which has always rejected the notion that the 
existence of inequality of bargaining power in a contractual relationship is a sufficient justification to interfere 
with the terms of the contracting parties’ bargain: National Westminster Bank plc v Morgan [1985] AC 686 
(UKHL) 708A-D (Lord Scarman) (appeal taken from EWCA (Civ)) and Uber BV v Aslam [2021] UKSC 5 [68] 
(Lord Leggatt) (appeal taken from EWCA (Civ)). 
6 Contrast this with the view of Lord Diplock who asserted that the basis for the restraint of trade doctrine was 
‘abuse of bargaining power’ and ‘… not some 19th-century economic theory about the benefit to the general 
public of freedom of trade…’: Schroeder Music Publishing Co. v Macauley [1974] 1 WLR 1308 (UKHL) 
1315F (appeal taken from EWCA (Civ)). It is also arguable that Lord Macclesfield’s judgment in Mitchel v 
Reynolds (1711) 1 P Wms 181 (Eng.) was partly motivated by a concern to temper inequality of bargaining 
power: see Harlan M Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73, No.4 HARV. L. REV 625, 637 (1960).  
For discussion of this point, see GORDON ANDERSON ET AL., THE COMMON LAW EMPLOYMENT 
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Developing this point further, the legal doctrine of restraint of trade can be thought of 
as a sorting mechanism for the common law to intercede in disputes where a number of liberties 
clash. And there are private and public dimensions to that mediating role. From the private 
angle, on one side of the equation lies freedom of contract and on the other sits the employee’s 
freedoms to quit (a contract), of labour mobility and to ply his/her trade. Having entered into 
an employment contract including a non-compete clause openly and freely, it is arguable that 
the employee’s and employer’s private interests in freedom of contract should be respected by 
holding the former as legally bound by that promise. On the other hand, there is the private 
interest in the employee’s liberty to quit his or her employment and to move and exercise 
his/her freedom to contract to take up employment with a(ny) new employer to carry on his/her 
trade or occupation, without the imposition of any onerous curbs. Apart from adjudicating 
between these private freedoms, the doctrine also performs another function in reaching a 
resolution where private and public interests conflict. It does so by striking a balance between 
the private legitimate interests of the employer in protecting its property rights, goodwill and 
trade connections on the one hand and the public interest in the promotion and facilitation of 
free competition, entrepreneurship and innovation on the other hand, which are essential for 
the operation of a competitive market economy.7 The doctrine mediates between these 
competing interests by deploying a “reasonableness” standard. This test is long-standing,8 but 
                                                 
RELATIONSHIP 177-178 (2017) and for an analysis as to how English common law tends to eschew over-
generalised concepts such as ‘inequality of bargaining power’ as a pretext for private law interventions, see 
Marcus Moore, Why Does Lord Denning’s Lead Balloon Intrigue Us Still? The Prospects of Finding a Unifying 
Principle for Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionability, 134 L.Q. REV. 257 (2018). 
7 MICHAEL J TREBILCOCK, THE COMMON LAW OF RESTRAINT OF TRADE: A LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 411-414 (Carswell 1986). However, the common law has consistently overlooked 
this public dimension, on which, see the discussion in part 4 below. 
8 Mitchel v Reynolds (1711) 1 P Wms 181 (Eng.).  
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not quite as old as the doctrine itself,9 and prescribes that the restriction imposed by the 
employer on the employee should be no more than is reasonably necessary for the employer to 
protect its legitimate interests: more later on the detail in sections 2 and 3 below.  
The main objective of this paper is to probe the basic common law rules on restraint of 
trade and to offer a critique. First, section two turns to briefly examine the theoretical 
imperative of upholding an employee’s negative liberty and how the doctrine attempts to do so 
by negotiating a secure path between the employee’s freedom to trade and the harms and 
injuries that its exercise may cause to others. In section three, the discussion moves on to 
forensically examine the legal concepts that are deployed to reconcile this tension and how 
they each perform that role. Section four considers the primary argument that animates the 
discussion in this article. And that is the claim that the broader interests of those potentially 
injured by the prioritisation of an employee’s freedom to compete and trade – for example, the 
wider society and the public – should be afforded even greater purchase than the restraint of 
trade doctrine hitherto has afforded them. The justifications for such an argument are also 
presented in this part, as well as the prescription, which comprises a package of reforms. The 
broader significance and originality of the latter lies in the extent to which it channels the public 
interest strand of the ‘reasonableness’ test addressing the enforceability of restrictive covenants 
as a means of enjoining the courts to take into account the economic power of employers. 
Section 5 then draws certain conclusions, namely that the omission of any analysis of labour 
market power in the application of the common law restraint of trade doctrine is no longer 
tenable in light of recent research findings on the prevalence/ubiquity of employer monopsony 
                                                 
9 See Dyer’s Case (1414) 2 Hen. 5, f 5, pl 26 (Eng.). For an historical account and critique of the development of 
the common law restraint of trade doctrine, see Blake, supra note 6, at 629-646 and Carrigan & Radan, supra 
note 3, at 125-135.  
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and the contribution of non-compete covenants in facilitating and entrenching uncompetitive 
labour markets. 
 
2. Where the Tension Has Traditionally Lain: Negative Liberty, Competing Freedoms, 
and Justified Interference 
The foundation for the restraint of trade doctrine developed by the common law is the classical 
liberal tradition. And more importantly, the philosophical concept of negative liberty, whose 
principal exponents were Berlin,10 Kant,11 Mill,12 Bentham,13 and Hobbes.14 As such, it is 
entirely rooted in principle rather than policy, having an entirely individualistic basis that is 
steeped in modern liberalism.15 In the words of Berlin: 
“I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men interferes 
with my activity... If I am prevented by others from doing what I could otherwise do, I 
am to that degree unfree; and if this area is contracted by other men beyond a certain 
minimum, I can be described as being coerced, or, it may be, enslaved…16 
                                                 
10 ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in ISAIAH BERLIN, LIBERTY, INCORPORATING FOUR 
ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 166-181 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002).  
11 IMMANUEL KANT, A CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (Paul Guyer & Allen Wood eds. & trans. 1998).  
12 JOHN STUART MILL, Of the Grounds and Limits of the Laisser-Faire or Non-Interference Principle, in 
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY WITH SOME OF THEIR APPLICATIONS TO SOCIAL 
PHILOSOPHY 334 (1994). 
13 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM (John Bowring ed., William Tait 1838-1843).  
14 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 146 (Richard Tuck ed., 1991). 
15 For the distinction between policy and principle in private law, see Ross Grantham & Darryn Jensen, The 
Proper Role of Policy in Private Law Adjudication, 68 U. TORONTO L.J (2018).  
16 BERLIN, supra note 10, at 169-170. 
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This passage yields the proposition that in order to facilitate an individual employee’s freedom, 
the state should refrain from sanctioning laws interfering in that individual’s sphere of action. 
That is what is meant by ‘negative liberty’. However, Berlin goes on to identify the limits to 
this principle. That is, those circumstances where non-interference will deprive the liberty of 
others or result in their harm:  
[However, it is] supposed that [my freedom] could not, as things were, be unlimited, 
because if it were, it would entail a state in which all men could boundlessly interfere 
with all other men; and this kind of ‘natural’ freedom would lead to social chaos … 
Consequently… the area of men’s free action must be limited by law… Upon what 
principle should this be done?... [compulsion can be justified and]… since justice 
demands that all individuals be entitled to a minimum of freedom, all other individuals 
[a]re of necessity to be restrained, if need be by force, from depriving anyone of it. 
Indeed the whole function of law [i]s the prevention of just such collisions.17 
This value of negative liberty is inherent in the common law’s approach to the employee’s 
freedom to trade. In particular, the common law developed the restraint of trade doctrine as a 
means of navigating between this freedom and non-compete covenants (“freely” entered into 
by the employee in the employment contract). In the words of Lord MacNaghten in Nordenfelt 
v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co: 
“The public have an interest in every person's carrying on his trade freely: so has the 
individual. All interference with individual liberty of action in trading, and all restraints 
of trade of themselves, if there is nothing more, are contrary to public policy, and 
therefore void. That is the general rule.”18 
                                                 
17 Id. at 169-174. Writer’s annotations appear in square brackets throughout this article. 
18 Nordenfelt v The Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co. Ltd. [1984] AC 535 (UKHL) 565 (appeal 
taken from EWCA (Civ)).  
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This passage illustrates how the common law prescribed that the employee’s freedom to ply 
his/her trade should generally take precedence over other freedoms such as freedom of contract, 
or policy considerations.19 And from the perspective of incentivising competition, the doctrine 
‘was perhaps the common law’s [greatest] contribution… for it [became] in consequence very 
difficult to prevent business and technical information from leaking to rivals’.20  
However, consistent with Berlin’s concerns to constrain negative liberty in the interests 
of ensuring that there is no imposition of harm on others or deprivation of the liberty of others, 
the common law rule was modified to impose limits. As such, any suggestion that the restraint 
of trade doctrine affords unremitting precedential priority to the employee’s freedom to ply 
his/her trade must provoke very strong resistance. In Tillman v Egon Zehnder Ltd.,21 Lord 
Wilson provided the following explanatory account of this common law development:  
“the absolute nature of the right of the ex-employee… irrespective of his covenant began 
to be tempered. For paradoxically the doctrine against restraint of trade was positively 
inhibiting trade. In Nordenfelt… Lord MacNaghten explained:  
“it was found that a rule so rigid and far-reaching must seriously interfere with 
transactions of every-day occurrence… [e.g.] every [former employee] was a possible 
rival. So the rule was relaxed.””22 
                                                 
19 Indeed, at one point in time, non-interference with the employee’s freedom was absolute and represented the 
extent of the doctrine: see the case law discussed in section 3 below that was decided prior to Mitchel v 
Reynolds (1711) 1 P Wms 181 (Eng.).  
20 WILLIAM CORNISH ET AL., LAW AND SOCIETY IN ENGLAND 1750-1950 339 (Hart Publishing 
2019).  
21 Tillman v Egon Zehnder Ltd. [2019] UKSC 32, [2020] AC 154, 164G-165B (appeal taken from EWCA 
(Civ)). 
22 Id. Author’s emphasis shown in italics in text. 
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In this way, the sentiments of the common law went through a process of adjustment, resulting 
in a recognition that there were limits to the prioritisation of the employee’s negative liberty. 
This was deemed justifiable on a mixture of grounds, some of which were reflective of the need 
to sustain other positive liberties – such as freedom of contract,23 the freedom to contract, and 
the freedom to quit (a contract), as well as various principles regarding the prevention of harm 
to, or unjustified intrusion in the freedom of, others, and the promotion of employee loyalty to 
the employer – and others more policy-oriented in nature, such as the protection of (the 
employer’s) property and other legitimate commercial interests, the prevention of opportunistic 
employee behaviour,24 the incentivisation of positive managerial behaviour,25 as well as the 
interests of the economy and public in incentivising increased productivity, innovation, 
business competition and enhanced economic efficiency.26 Positive liberties are as equally 
fundamental as negative liberties and should be upheld and protected by the law insofar as they 
                                                 
23 However, interestingly, when the current incarnation of the restraint of trade doctrine (to include the 
‘legitimate interest’ and ‘reasonableness’ strands of the test) was fashioned by Lord Macclesfield in 1711 in 
Mitchel v Reynolds, there is a strong claim that his Lordship was not particularly concerned about upholding 
freedom of contract: see Blake, supra note 6, at 637. Instead, this came much later in the Victorian period, e.g. 
see the judgment of Jessel MR in Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v Sampson (1875) LR 19 Eq 462, (Ch) 
at 465 (Eng.).  
24 In the absence of such provisions, ‘workers would have an incentive to behave opportunistically–to try to 
violate such contracts and capture for themselves the value of the [confidential information and trade secrets of 
the employer]’: Paul H. Rubin & Peter Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to Compete, 10 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 93, 98 (1981).  
25 Without such clauses, employers are more likely to be reluctant to invest in training for, and the specific 
human capital of, their employees, thus resulting in inefficient levels of investment at a macro level in the 
economy: see Id. 93 & 95-96.  
26 See Blake, supra note 6, at 650. 
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enable persons to fulfil their own choices and exercise their autonomy.27 Seen in this light, the 
doctrine of restraint of trade is the means by which the negative liberty of the employee to trade 
is weighed against the same employee’s expression of positive liberty in the guise of the 
exercise of their freedom of contract under the non-compete covenant. Lord MacNaghten is 
instructive in describing how the restraint of trade doctrine was adapted to strike this balance: 
“It is a sufficient justification, and indeed it is the only justification [for interfering in 
an employee’s liberty after the termination of the contract of employment], if the 
restriction is reasonable—reasonable, that is, in reference to the interests of the parties 
concerned and reasonable in reference to the interests of the public, so framed and so 
guarded as to afford adequate protection to the party in whose favour it is imposed, 
while at the same time it is in no way injurious to the public.”28 
In this passage, Lord MacNaghten makes the point that the lawfulness of the restraint 
is measured in light of legal concepts such as ‘legitimate interest’ and ‘reasonableness’, as well 
as legal techniques such as the ‘proportionality’ yardstick. It is by these three legal measures 
that the law decides whether the employee’s negative liberty to trade should yield to their 
positive liberty of contract, or vice versa. And if we unpack in turn each of the received notions 
of ‘legitimate interest’, ‘reasonableness’ and ‘proportionality’, the former demands that the 
employer identify a legitimate commercial or other interest in relying on the non-compete 
restriction. As noted by Lord Wilberforce in Stenhouse Ltd. v Phillips,29 the legitimate interest 
must be something that can be likened to a proprietary right. For example, the courts have 
recognised the trade secrets or customer base and connections of the employer as sufficiently 
                                                 
27 See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 409-410 (Clarendon, 1986). 
28 Nordenfelt v The Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co. Ltd. [1984] AC 535 (UKHL) 565 (appeal 
taken from EWCA (Civ)).  
29[1974] AC 391 (PC) 400E-G (appeal taken from NSW, Austl.). 
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worthy of material protection in this regard.30 This is reflective of the long-term investment 
made by the employer in amassing such resources necessary for running the business, rather 
than the employee’s ‘innate skills, or more generally, skills which [he/she] brings to the 
job…’31 which belong and pertain solely to the employee. For that reason, a proprietorial 
interest of the employer must be identified, which is distinguishable from the employee’s own 
skills, experience, know-how and general knowledge.32 In this way, a general exclusion of 
competition will never be upheld in favour of the employer.33 This takes us onto the second 
requirement that the non-compete covenant must be reasonable, which means that it must go 
no further than is reasonably necessary to achieve or satisfy that legitimate interest. And in 
order to make this evaluation, the courts adopt the proportionality measure of review. This 
involves enquiring whether the employer’s need for that specific covenant to protect the 
invoked legitimate interest is so pressing that it outweighs the harm to the employee of being 
deprived of his/her liberty to trade and/or any harm to the wider interests of the public, e.g. in 
                                                 
30 Herbert Morris Ltd. Saxelby [1916] 1 AC 688 (UKHL) at 701-2 (Lord Atkinson) and One Step (Support) Ltd. 
V Morris-Garner [2016] EWCA Civ 180, [2017] QB 1, 11D-F [32] (Christopher Clarke LJ). There are 
exceptions applicable in the case of commercial connections: Mason v Provident Clothing & Supply Co. [1913] 
AC 724 (UKHL) 743 (Lord Moulton) (appeal taken from EWCA (Civ)). The non-compete clause itself may 
specify a particular legitimate interest and if none is identified, the courts will look at the surrounding 
circumstances to attempt to find one: Office Angels Ltd v Rainer-Thomas and O’Connor [1991] IRLR 214 
(EWCA) 219 (Sir Christopher Slade) (appeal taken from QBD). 
31 Stephen A. Smith, Reconstructing Restraint of Trade, 15 OXF. J. LEG. STUD. 565, 577 (1995). See also 
TREBILCOCK, supra note 7, at 119-142. 
32 For example, see FSS Travel and Leisure Systems v Johnson [1998] IRLR 382 (EWCA (Civ)) 385 [29]-[34] 
(Lord Justice Mummery). 
33 Scottish Farmers Dairy Co (Glasgow) v McGhee (1933) SC 148, 152-153 (Lord President Clyde) (Scot.). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3860238
University of Edinburgh School of Law Working Paper No 2021/13 
Page 13 of 41 
 
facilitating competition, encouraging innovation, etc.34  And a variety of factors are deployed 
in support of this balancing act, which we now come to address in section 3. 
 




The common law courts have adopted a series of factors that may be understood as variables 
that function as finely tuned proxies for the ‘legitimate interest’, and ‘reasonableness’ criteria, 
as well as the process of balancing them off against each other pursuant to the ‘proportionality’ 
exercise. Another way of expressing the same point is that these variables enable the courts to 
evaluate whether the terms of the covenant fall within or go beyond what is reasonably 
necessary for the employer to achieve its legitimate interests of protecting its customer base 
and trade secrets. To that extent, they are not external to the common law test, but can be 
thought of as inherent within, and lying just under the surface of, the principal criteria. In 
applying each of these variables, the reasonableness of the non-compete clause must be 
ascertained by reference to reasonable persons in the position of the employer and the employee 
at the point in time when the contract of employment was entered into, rather than taking into 
account the future or subsequent developments.35 Another basic rule is that the onus falls on 
                                                 
34 MARK FREEDLAND, THE PERSONAL EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT 182, (2003). However, the second 
public-oriented element of this test is commonly ignored by the courts and conflated with the private bipolar 
interest into one step: see section 4 below. 
35 See Gledhow Autoparts v Delaney [1965] 1 WLR 1366 (EWCA (Civ)), 1377D (Diplock LJ), Coppage v 
Safety Net Security Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 1176 [2013] IRLR 970, 972 [9] (Sir Bernard Rix) (appeal taken 
from QBD) and QBE Management Services (UK) Ltd. v Dymoke [2012] EWHC 116 (QB),  [2012] IRLR 458, 
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the employer to establish the reasonableness of the non-compete restriction.36 Likewise, that in 
testing the validity of the non-compete restraint, hypothetical factors are not to be factored into 
the equation, particularly if they are speculative or extremely unlikely to have entered into the 
reasonable contemplation of the parties. 
 
The Relevant Variables 
 
Of central significance in carrying out the balancing part of the proportionality exercise are 
factors such as the extent of the territorial restriction and the duration of the period of the non-
compete restraint.37 The degree of clarity surrounding the criteria to be applied in relation to 
these two factors could not be more far removed from each other. By way of illustration, a 12-
month prohibition will generally be treated as unreasonably long and as such, an illegitimate 
restraint on general competition with the employer.38 Meanwhile, if the restrictive period is six 
                                                 
480 [210] (Haddon-Cave J). For that reason, if the employer ceases to have a relevant legitimate interest (such 
as a trade secret or customer base and connection) after the non-compete covenant is entered into, it will remain 
enforceable: Towry EJ v Bennett [2012] EWHC 224 (QB). 
36 QBE Management Services (UK) Ltd. v Dymoke [2012] EWHC 116 (QB), [2012] IRLR 458, 480 [210] 
(Haddon-Cave J). However, if the employer is successful in discharging this burden, as regards the employer’s 
preferred remedy of injunction, the onus shifts to the employee to persuade the court why it should be refused. 
37 See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 183-184. Of course, the effect of both is looked at cumulatively, e.g. 
if the territorial restriction is very limited, then greater latitude will be given in respect of the temporal restriction 
and vice versa: see Fitch v Dewes [1921] 2 AC 158 (UKHL) 163 (Lord Chancellor Birkenhead) (appeal taken 
from EWCA (Civ)). 
38 See Energy Renewals Ltd v Borg [2014] EWHC 2166 (Ch), [2014] IRLR 713 and Prophet plc v Huggett 
[2014] EWCA Civ 1013, [2014] IRLR 797. However, for some exceptions, see A&D Bedrooms Ltd. v Michael 
1984 SLT 297 (Scot.), Scottish Farmer’s Dairy (Glasgow) Ltd. v McGhee 1933 SC 148 (Scot.), Freshasia Foods 
Ltd. v Lu [2019] EWHC 638 (Ch), Thomas v Farr plc [2007] EWCA Civ 118, [2007] ICR 932, Merlin 
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months and this is broadly comparable to the employee’s period of notice of termination of 
employment, it is very common for this to be considered a reasonable period.39 The general 
approach as regards temporal restrictions can be contrasted with the common law’s attitude 
towards the extent of the geographical area, which is characterised by a large degree of 
ambiguity. In one famous case, although the footprint of the restriction extended to the entire 
world, it was nonetheless ruled to be reasonable,40 whereas in another case a 1.2 mile radius of 
the City of London was held to be too broad in scope and unenforceable.41 This underscores 
the point that there is little to be gained by invoking precedents on territorial restrictions as part 
of any litigation strategy in a particular dispute, since the circumstances of each case will differ 
where the question of the validity of a covenant is in play.42 This feeds into the insight made 
                                                 
Financial Consultations Ltd v Cooper [2014] EWHC 1196 (QB), [2014] IRLR 610 and D v P [2016] EWCA 
Civ 87, [2016] IRLR 355. 
39 Threlfall v ECD Insight Ltd [2012] EWHC 3543 (QB), [2013] IRLR 185. However, this was not the outcome 
in Bartholomews Agri Foods Ltd v Thornton [2016] EWHC 648 (QB), [2016] IRLR 432, Ashcourt Rowan 
Financial Planning Ltd v Hall [2013] EWHC 1185 (QB), [2013] IRLR 637, CEF Holdings Ltd v Mundey 
[2012] EWHC 1524 (QB), [2012] IRLR 912 or Phoenix Partners Group LLP v Asoyag [2010] EWHC 846 
(QB), [2010] IRLR 594. 
40 Nordenfelt v The Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co. Ltd. [1984] AC 535 (UKHL) 554-555 (Lord 
Watson) (appeal taken from EWCA (Civ)). For the same outcome, see Bluebell Apparel Ltd. v Dickinson 1978 
SC 16 (Scot.). Contrast this decision with Hinton & Higgs (UK) Ltd. v Murphy 1988 SC 353 (Scot.). 
41Office Angels Ltd v Rainer-Thomas and O’Connor [1991] IRLR 214 (EWCA) (appeal taken from QBD). But 
what seems certain is that there must be an area restriction, otherwise the covenant will be invalid: Ashcourt 
Rowan Financial Planning Ltd v Hall [2013] EWHC 1185 (QB), [2013] IRLR 637. See also Merlin Financial 
Consultations Ltd v Cooper [2014] EWHC 1196 (QB), [2014] IRLR 610 and Freshasia Foods Ltd. v Lu [2019] 
EWHC 638 (Ch).  
42 Coppage v Safety Net Security Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 1176 [2013] IRLR 970, 972 [9] (Sir Bernard Rix) (appeal 
taken from QBD).  
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by Ryan about this area of law, which is the extent to which it is characterised by “intense fact-
specificity”.43 
 There is an undercurrent in the case law to the effect that the higher the position of the 
employee (who has been restrained) in the employer’s organisation, then the more likely the 
covenant will be reasonable. In this way, it may be claimed that the likelihood of a finding of 
reasonableness increases proportionally to the seniority of the employee. This can be justified 
on the basis that such a class of worker will have greater access to the fruits of the employer’s 
prior investments in certain clients and secret processes.44 For this reason, reports of post-
employment non-compete restrictions being successfully upheld in the US courts where the 
employees restrained are low-paid workers employed in a storage warehouse or the fast-food 
industry are unlikely to be emulated in the English courts.45 What is also of relevance is whether 
colleagues of employees at the same level of expertise are subject to similarly crafted restraints.  
                                                 
43 Desmond Ryan, Restating Restraint of Trade: The Implications of the Supreme Court’s Judgment in Tillman v 
Egon Zehnder Ltd, 49 ILJ 595, 596 (2020). See also DOUGLAS BRODIE, THE CONTRACT OF 
EMPLOYMENT 142 (2008).  
44 See Associated Foreign Exchange Ltd v International Foreign Exchange (UK) Ltd [2010] EWHC 1178 (Ch), 
[2010] IRLR 964; CEF Holdings Ltd v Mundey [2012] EWHC 1524 (QB), [2012] IRLR 912. 
45 See James J Prescott et al., Understanding Non-Competition Agreements: The 2014 Non-Compete Survey 
Project, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV 369, 372-374 (2016); Norman D Bishara & Evan Starr, The Incomplete Non-
Compete Picture, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 497, 499 & 508 (2016); Clare O’Connor, Does Jimmy John's 
Non-Compete Clause For Sandwich Makers Have Legal Legs?, FORBES.COM (Oct. 15 2014) 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/clareoconnor/2014/10/15/does-jimmy-johns-non-compete-clause-for-sandwich-
makers-have-legal-legs/?sh=73803ac24107  and THE WHITE HOUSE, NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS: 
ANALYSIS OF THE USAGE, POTENTIAL ISSUES, AND STATE RESPONSES (May. 2016) 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/non-competes_report_final2.pdf . 
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However, of far greater importance are two factors in particular. First, there is the 
definition of the employer’s business or market (within which the employer is operating) in the 
non-compete covenant.46 If the business to be protected from competition is too broad in scope, 
extending beyond that market, the covenant is likely to be struck down. For example, consider 
an employer whose commercial operation consists of the provision of IT software billing 
systems for use by professional service firms, such as auditors, attorneys, accountants or 
actuaries. If the covenant provides that the employee is prohibited from engaging in post-
employment competition in respect of IT software systems in general, then the market will be 
treated as having been drawn far too widely, since the employer’s business falls within a very 
small subset of such a category. In such a case, the clause will be ruled to be in restraint of 
trade for the reason that it extends beyond what is reasonably necessary to protect the 
employer’s legitimate interests.47 Another illustration of the same point is where a non-compete 
clause directs that the competing market is restricted to that with which the employer was 
engaged within a defined period of time prior to (e.g. 12 months) the termination of the 
employee’s contract of employment. In such a case, since the market has been limited, the more 
likely it will be that the contractual provision will be ruled to be reasonable.48 
                                                 
46 For discussion, see DYSON HEYDON, THE RESTRAINT OF TRADE DOCTRINE 158-163 (2018). 
47 Scully UK Ltd v Lee [1998] IRLR 259 (EWCA (Civ)). An especially fraught issue arises where an employee 
competes by carrying out a commercial line of business after leaving the employer’s employment. If the 
employer dropped that line of business and the employee was responsible for its initial development whilst he 
was employed for the employer, there is precedent to suggest that the employee will not have infringed the 
covenant: see Wincanton v Cranny [2000] IRLR 716 (EWCA(Civ)), Threlfall v ECD Insight Ltd [2012] EWHC 
3543 (QB), [2013] IRLR 185 and Phoenix Partners Group LLP v Asoyag [2010] EWHC 846 (QB), [2010] 
IRLR 594. 
48 See HEYDON., supra note 46, at 164-173. 
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 Turning to the second consequential variable, this forms part of the same conceptual 
tapestry as the restricted market of the employer and focuses on the competitive activities in 
respect of which the employee is restrained. The significance of this factor has risen in direct 
proportion to the increase in the specialisation of occupations and jobs and the division of 
labour in the economy.49 Like the restricted market, the activities that the employee is 
prohibited from engaging in post-termination must also be carefully circumscribed.50 For 
example, if the employee is prevented from selling certain products involved in the employer’s 
scope of business, these should be competitive with those of the employer, or sufficiently 
comparable at the very least.51 Meanwhile, if the employee is restrained from being ‘indirectly 
interested in’ any business competing with the employer, this will extend to an embargo on the 
employee holding a small or large shareholding in a competing corporation.52 
 
Remedies  
As noted by Mr Justice Fredman in the case of Argus Media Ltd. v Halim, an injunction is the 
main remedy where the courts rule that a non-compete covenant has been breached.53 To that 
extent, this turns the general rule about the attitude of the English courts towards the availability 
of injunctions (in enforcing the terms of a contract of employment) on its head.54 Indeed, some 
                                                 
49 Blake, supra note 6, at 675. 
50 CEF Holdings Ltd v Mundey [2012] EWHC 1524 (QB), [2012] IRLR 912. 
51 Argus Media Ltd. v Halim [2019] EWHC 42 (QB), [2019] IRLR 442, 456 (Mr Justice Freedman). 
52 Tillman v Egon Zehnder Ltd. [2019] UKSC 32, [2020] AC 154, 172B-D (Lord Wilson) (appeal taken from 
EWCA (Civ)). 
53 [2019] EWHC 42 (QB), [2019] IRLR 442, 473 [215] (Mr Justice Freedman). For discussion of this point, see 
HEYDON., supra note 46, at 119-123. 
54 Which was one of hostility: see De Francesco v Barnum (1890) 45 Ch D 430, 438 (Fry LJ) (Eng.); Ridge v 
Baldwin [1964] AC 40 (UKHL), 65 (Lord Reid) (appeal taken from EWCA (Civ)); and Wilson v St Helen’s 
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commentators have lamented this phenomenon, describing it as ‘arguably a perverse 
development in the law…  that… has evolved over time to create a monstrous distortion in 
contemporary… employment law’.55  
An injunction involves the court making an order restraining the liberty of the employee 
in accordance with the terms of the non-compete covenant. As such, there is no obligation on 
the employer to demonstrate any proof of loss arising from the employee’s breach of the 
covenant.56 However, it should be underscored that an injunction is a remedy that is at the 
discretion of the court, albeit that the onus is on the employee to convince the court that the 
injunction should be refused.57 Seen from this perspective, whether a court should grant an 
injunction is an equitable matter, meaning that employers must come before the court with 
clean hands. As such, where the employer has constructively, wrongfully or unfairly dismissed 
the employee, the balance of equities in the case may point against the award of an injunction.58 
A second matter to stress arises from the case of Dyson v Pellerey, where the court recognised 
that there will be cases where it would be so prejudicial to an employee and cause him such 
hardship that it would be unconscionable for the employer to be given injunctive relief. This 
will be particularly relevant if no damage to the claimant would be caused if there were no 
enforcement.59 In such cases, the employer will be awarded nominal damages. On the other 
                                                 
Borough Council [1999] 2 AC 52 (UKHL), 84A–B (Lord Slynn of Hadley) (appeal taken from EWCA (Civ)). 
55 For discussion of this point, see ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 185. 
56 Insurance Co. v Lloyd’s Syndicate [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 272 (QBD), 277 (Colman J) and Dyson v Pellerey 
[2016] EWCA Civ 87, [2016] ICR 688, 692-693 (Sir Colin Rimer). The more difficult it is to quantify the 
damages, the more persuasive the case for an injunction: Plowman & Son Ltd. v Ash [1964] 1 WLR 568 (EWCA 
(Civ)) and Rentokil v Kramer (1986) SLT 114 (Scot.). 
57 Insurance Co. v Lloyd’s Syndicate [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 272 (QBD), 277 (Colman J). 
58 Cantor Fitzgerald International v Bird [2002] IRLR 867 (QBD), 885 [140]-[145] (Mr Justice McCombe). 
59 Dyson v Pellerey [2016] EWCA Civ 87, [2016] ICR 688, 692-693 (Sir Colin Rimer). 
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hand, where the employee subject to the restraint is very highly paid, the more likely the courts 
will grant an injunction to enforce the non-compete covenant.60 A final pertinent issue is 
whether the employer will derive any practical utility from enforcement.61 
 
Mandatory or derogable law?  
The doctrine of restraint of trade plays a regulatory function by operating as a mandatory norm. 
The mandatory nature of the doctrine means that it is not possible to contract out of it.62 This 
will cover overt, as well as less bald, attempts at the disapplication of the operation of the 
doctrine.63 For example, it is not unusual for a contract of employment to include a provision 
in a non-compete covenant that if the court rules that its terms are unenforceable, the parties 
explicitly confer on the court the power to rewrite the contract to the minimum extent that is 
necessary to render it enforceable. However, the courts have refused to uphold such a 
contractual provision. This is on two grounds. First, for the reason that it would only encourage 
litigation and secondly, and more importantly, that it would involve the courts in an illegitimate 
reframing of the terms of the parties’ private contract, thus enabling them to escape the clutches 
of the doctrine, which is something that they will not do.64 
The rationale for this uncompromising stance is its public-protective purpose. It is 
designed to protect the employee and wider society from ‘externalities’, i.e. social and 
                                                 
60 Tullett Prebon plc v BGC Brokers LP [2010] EWHC 484 (QB), [2010] IRLR 648, 693 [222] (Jack J). 
61 Jack Allen (Sales & Services) v Smith [1999] IRLR 19 (Scot.). 
62 Hinton & Higgs (UK) Ltd. v Murphy 1988 SC 353 (Scot.) and BRODIE, supra note 43, at 133. See Eyal 
Zamir & Ian Ayres, A Theory of Mandatory Rules: Typology, Policy and Design, 99 TEX. L. REV. 283 (2020).  
63 For a less overt example, see Sadler v Imperial Life Assurance Co. of Canada Ltd. [1988] IRLR 388 (QBD) 
(Eng.). 
64 Townends Group Ltd. v Cobb [2004] EWHC 3432 (Ch)[60]-[61] (Mr Briggs QC) (Eng). See also Seabrokers 
Ltd. v Riddell [2007] CSOH 146 (Scot.). 
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economic harms to the employee and others in society.65 This finds its expression in the extent 
to which it polices and constrains the exercise of powers conferred by express contractual 
terms. The main effect of the court finding that a non-compete restriction is unreasonable is 
that it will be rendered void, meaning that the courts will not entertain its enforceability by 
holding that it never existed in the first place. 
 
Severance?  
Despite the entrenched status of the doctrine and the inability to contract out of it by agreement, 
somewhat counterintuitively, it is possible for the courts to sever words from a non-compete 
covenant under carefully prescribed controls in order to draw it in a way that renders it 
enforceable. For example, if a portion of the non-compete covenant that is causing it to exceed 
the reasonableness test can be excised whilst leaving the remainder of the covenant intact, the 
highest court in the land in the UK has recently indicated its willingness to preserve the validity 
of the restriction.66 The courts will do so by wielding their metaphorical “blue pencil” to 
remove the impugned wording. In Tillman, Lord Wilson’s judgment speaks to the three criteria 
that must be satisfied before the English courts will entertain severance: first, the unenforceable 
portion of the non-compete clause must be capable of being removed without the necessity of 
                                                 
65 For discussion, see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory 
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L. J. 87, 88-89 (1990). In the context of the employment relationship, see also Cass 
Sunstein, Rights Minimal Terms, and Solidarity: A Comment, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1041, 1054 & 1057 (1984); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REV. 205, 240ff (2001); Guy Davidov, 
Non-waivability in Labour Law, 40 OXF. J. LEG. STUD. 482, 497 (2020).  
66 Tillman v Egon Zehnder Ltd. [2019] UKSC 32, [2020] AC 154 (appeal taken from EWCA (Civ)). For 
commentary, see Ryan, supra note 43, and David Cabrelli, The Evolving Restraint of Trade Doctrine: Tillman v 
Egon Zehnder Ltd., UK LABOUR LAW BLOG (Sept. 2 2019), https://uklabourlawblog.com/2019/09/02/the-
evolving-restraint-of-trade-doctrine-tillman-v-egon-zehnder-ltd-david-cabrelli/. 
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adding to or modifying the wording of the text that remains. In this way, whilst the courts can 
strike out offending words, they are precluded from interpolating words into the contract, since 
this would amount to an illegitimate and unwarranted form of rewriting the parties’ contract. 
Secondly, the remainder of the non-compete clause must be capable of being supported by 
adequate consideration. Finally, if the court decides to modify the clause, there must be no 
significant change in the overall effect of all the post-employment restraints in the contract and 
it is over to the employer to establish that its removal would not do so. 
This English law approach towards the severance of provisions of non-compete clauses 
is especially troubling insofar as it would appear to give a licence to employers to ‘… fashion 
truly ominous covenants with confidence that they will be pared down and enforced when the 
facts of a particular case are not unreasonable… [which] smacks of having one’s employee’s 
cake, and eating it too’.67 To that extent, the decision of the UK Supreme Court was symbolic 
inasmuch as it threw into sharp relief the lengths that the courts will go to preserve non-compete 
covenants imposed on employees in their contracts of employment.68 However, this approach 
and decision is surprising for a number of reasons, not least of which is the sentiment of 
scepticism towards non-compete restrictions felt by the present British Government. This 
causes us to pose a salient question, which is what it is that lies behind the nervous attitude of 




                                                 
67 Blake, supra note 6, at 683. 
68 Having said that, Lord Wilson in Tillman did strike a note that caution must be exercised in deploying 
severance too readily in the case of a rank-and-file, rather than a high earning or senior, employee: Tillman v 
Egon Zehnder Ltd. [2019] UKSC 32, [2020] AC 154, 181E-G (appeal taken from EWCA (Civ)). 
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4. From (Employee) Liberty to Policy? 
 
The preceding discussion reinforces the notion that competing positive freedoms of the 
employee and the private interests of employers will not infrequently trump concerns for the 
employee’s liberties to trade and of labour mobility. Likewise, the exposition of the current 
operative legal rules in English law illustrates how the ‘reasonableness’ and ‘legitimate 
interests’ tests exert a very deep hold on the restraint of trade doctrine. And having been 
cemented into place as a central part of the firmament of English employment and contract law 
as long ago as 1711,69 one might be forgiven for believing that these two lynchpins of the 
doctrine would be perfectly entitled to inhale deeply of their own success. But any hubris 
concerning the assuredness of their position in the common law would be misplaced, since a 
lively sense of the contingency of their foundations as well as their adverse effects ought to 
conduce towards a certain level of humility. There are at least two reasons for this proposition. 
First, prior to the decision of the Chancery Court in Mitchel v Reynolds in 1711, the common 
law could justifiably lay claim to a much greater level of conceptual coherence and clarity in 
clinging doggedly to an uncompromising position in favour of open labour markets. In Dyer’s 
Case decided in 1414,70 the English courts ruled that an express contractual term that prohibited 
a former servant from plying his trade for a period of six months in the same town as his master 
was void. The rationale for this decision was that free competition should at all times be 
                                                 
69 Mitchel v Reynolds (1711) 1 P Wms 181 (Eng.). And reaffirmed by the highest courts in 1894, 1916 and 
2019: Nordenfelt v The Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co. Ltd. [1984] AC 535 (UKHL) (appeal 
taken from EWCA (Civ)), Herbert Morris Ltd. Saxelby [1916] 1 AC 688 (UKHL) and Tillman v Egon Zehnder 
Ltd. [2019] UKSC 32, [2020] AC 154 (appeal taken from EWCA (Civ)). 
70 (1414) 2 Hen. 5, f 5, pl 26 (Eng.). For discussion, see 3 Sir WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY 
OF ENGLISH LAW 56-57 (1942). 
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prioritised over an employer’s property interests or employee loyalty to the employer. Seen 
from this perspective, there was no such ‘reasonableness’ or ‘legitimate interests’ criteria then, 
which was a situation that lasted for almost 300 years until 1711 when they were appended to 
the restraint of trade doctrine in Mitchel v Reynolds.  
Secondly, heightened concerns about the uneven distributional impacts of covenants 
and their economic effects has risen amongst contemporary policy-makers. The suggestion is 
that the common law ‘reasonableness’ and ‘legitimate interests’ factors may be more amenable 
to removal or modification (at the very least) via legislation than traditionally thought, 
particularly insofar as they are felt to be responsible for impeding employees’ access to new 
positions which would spur a rise in productivity levels and a resultant  upswing in welfare in 
the economy. For example, the UK Government has recently issued a consultation paper 
seeking evidence from consultees on the impact of post-termination restrictive covenants on 
economic growth, competition and innovation.71 In that paper, the UK Government gave voice 
to the anxiety that by enabling post-termination restrictive covenants in employment contracts 
to be enforced, the common law has a chilling effect on entrepreneurship by hindering labour 
mobility, preventing workers from starting up their own business after leaving a job, and 
turning their ideas into a start-up. Indeed, the policy proposals for the reform of the law 
governing post-termination restrictive covenants can be viewed as a thinly veiled criticism of 
                                                 
71 See DBEIS, Non-Compete Covenants, in MEASURES TO REFORM POST-TERMINATION NON-
COMPETE CLAUSES IN CONTRACTS OF EMPLOYMENT (Dec. 4 2020) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/measures-to-reform-post-termination-non-compete-clauses-in-
contracts-of-employment. For commentary, see FT, UK Aims to Nurture Start-ups by Curbing Non-compete 
Clauses, FINANCIAL TIMES (Dec.1 2020) https://www.ft.com/content/61e5269b-07d1-49d3-afa4-
8bafaebead41. The UK Government had previously launched a call for evidence in 2016: see Non-compete 
clauses—Call for Evidence, GOV.UK (Jun. 2016) https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/non-compete-
clauses-call-for-evidence (last visited 14 January 2021). 
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the effectiveness of the “reasonableness” and “legitimate interests” strands in the common law 
restraint of trade doctrine. The proposed legislative reforms hunt in packs of two: first, that 
immediately before the employment relationship begins, the employer will be expected to 
provide written notice to the employee about the existence of the covenant, together with an 
explanation of its exact terms, and that employers should continue to pay the former employees 
their salary or compensation in lieu for the duration of the temporal restriction in the covenant 
if they invoke its terms;72 and secondly, that non-compete restrictions simply be banned. 73 It 
has been argued that by banning non-compete restrictions, ‘a boost would be given to labour 
mobility and the overall health of the economy would benefit from new industries and fresh 
ideas emerging’.74 However, the greater significance in this point is how it lays bare the much 
broader disjuncture between the grounds for the common law doctrine and the UK 
Government’s arguments for the abolition of non-compete covenants. That is to say that the 
theoretical concerns for the negative liberty and autonomy of the employee dissected in section 
2 play second fiddle to policy considerations preferring that the public interest be prioritised, 
as well as societal welfare and the greater good. 
For this reason, the UK Government’s recent consultation paper raises a much more 
profound question. And that is whether the broader interests of those potentially injured by the 
prioritisation of the employer’s legitimate interests over the employee’s freedom to compete 
                                                 
72 On the relationship between any assessment of the consideration paid for a restriction and the substantive 
fairness of the covenant, see Stephen A. Smith, Future Freedom and Freedom of Contract, 59 MOD. L. REV. 
167, 172 (1995). 
73 DBEIS, supra note 71, at 12. Of course, this second suggestion that the doctrine be abolished would take the 
law back to the unvarnished (and avowedly uncompromising) test inaugurated in Dyer’s Case, which lasted for 
approximately three hundred years until the decision in Mitchel v Reynolds (1711) 1 P Wms 181 (Eng.).  
74 See also Carrigan & Radan, supra note 3, at 125. 
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and trade – for example, the public, consumers of an employer’s goods and services, wider 
society and the economy – should be afforded much greater purchase than the restraint of trade 
doctrine has hitherto afforded them. That would be ironic for two reasons. First, when seen 
within the context of the UK Supreme Court’s recent approach to the treatment of severance in 
Tillman v Egon Zehnder: in that decision, by taking it upon themselves to excise certain words 
from the covenant where its terms were felt to be overly broad, the courts effectively provided 
employers with a second bite of the cherry to ensure its validity and enforceability.75 And 
secondly, in light of experience regarding the common law’s approach towards Lord 
MacNaghten’s ‘reasonable in reference to the interests of the public… [and] in no way 
injurious to the public’ limb of the ‘reasonableness’ test in Nordenfelt.76 To put this matter 
more bluntly, although it is in the common law’s invocation of this ‘public’ element that the 
notion of collective and societal goals is prayed in aid against the enforcement of non-compete 
covenants, in reality, this factor has been largely overlooked by the courts in exercising the 
proportionality review.77 Instead, the foremost attention is given instead to the bipolar private 
interests and freedoms of the parties to the employment contract in judging the reasonableness 
of a covenant. The effect is to conflate the bipolar private interests and public interest parts of 
the ‘reasonableness’ test into one single step, which Sir Patrick Atiyah memorably referred to 
as the adoption “… in a somewhat new form, [of] the old economic theory of the harmony of 
                                                 
75 Having said that, in another recent decision examining the applicability of the restraint of trade doctrine in the 
context of land, the UK Supreme Court shifted towards a ‘trading society’ test, which itself signals a turn towards 
greater recognition of the public interest in preference to those of the individual covenantor and covenantees: 
Peninsula Securities Ltd. v Dunnes Stores (Bangor) Ltd. [2020] UKSC 36, [2020] 3 WLR 521. 
76 Nordenfelt v The Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co. Ltd. [1984] AC 535 (UKHL) 565 (appeal taken 
from EWCA (Civ)).  
77 For a discussion and analysis, see TREBILCOCK, supra note 7, at 106-109.  
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interests”.78 As such, in those cases where the public interest limb has been considered, it has 
been said to add little to the ‘legitimate interest’ and ‘reasonableness’ assessment.79 A number 
of commentators have suggested the approach of the common law is coherent on the ground 
that “if it is reasonable in [the]… interest [of the employer and the employee restrained], then 
there is no undue interference with individual liberty and the public interest test is satisfied 
[and]… if it is not reasonable it must be because the liberty of one of the parties is unduly 
restricted and the agreement is ipso facto contrary to the public interest”.80 Likewise, it has 
been claimed that ‘… the [public interest in terms of the] social cost of preventing an employee 
from going to a job at which he would be more productive is theoretically equal, given an 
efficient market, with the economic loss to the individual.’81 In fact, where a non-competition 
clause has been held to be reasonable as regards the interests of the private parties, Lord Parker 
in Commonwealth of Australia v Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd. went as far as to claim that a 
heavy burden was imposed on any party attempting to prove that it was contrary to the public 
interest.82 Seen in light of the evidence emerging from the English courts, the notion that the 
common law is acting as a barrier to the ‘unleash[ing of technological] innovation, [the creation 
                                                 
78 PATRICK ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 699ff (1979). 
79 Quilter Private Client Advisers Ltd. v Falconer [2020] EWHC 3294 (QB) [179] (Calver J). 
80 CHITTY, CONTRACTS §16-127 (33rd ed. 2020).  
81 Blake, supra note 6, at 687. A similar argument has been put forward by Smith, Reconstructing Restraint of 
Trade, supra note 31, at 594-595 and Smith, Future Freedom and Freedom of Contract, supra note 72, at 170 to 
the effect that the “’public interest’ test is indistinguishable in substance from the parties’ interests test–because 
the parties’ interest test measures objective need rather than subjective benefit..”. 
82 Commonwealth of Australia v Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd. [1913] AC 781 (PC) 795 (Austl.). To that extent, 
‘… by equating the public interests with reasonableness between the parties to the contract, [the judiciary] 
avoided deciding questions about the public interests in competition”: Robert B. Stevens, Experience and 
Experiment in the Legal Control of Competition in the United Kingdom, 70 YALE L.J. 867, 872 (1961). 
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of] the conditions for new jobs and increasing[ing] competition’83 by disregarding the public 
interest and wider economic considerations in enabling non-compete covenants to be enforced, 
may indeed be a plausible claim.  
This approach and mindset of the English courts fails to take seriously the proposition 
that there may conceivably be circumstances where an appreciable gap or difference opens up 
between the bipolar private interests of the parties and the public interest when a non-compete 
covenant is enforced. This can be articulated in terms of a disjuncture between the private costs 
imposed on the employee (in being restrained) and the resulting associated social costs incurred 
by the public. For example, the ‘… [public interest and] social cost might be different from 
private cost… when the restraint is being used [to enable the employer]… to monopolize the 
business in a specific community’.84 This raises the tantalising possibility that a particular 
environment or set of conditions – such as monopoly – may justify greater recourse to the 
public interest criteria in ascertaining whether a covenant is reasonable: more later on this 
fundamental point below. 
Any proposal to assign greater significance to the broader public interest in determining 
the validity of restrictive covenants would essentially herald a major step-change in approach 
insofar as it would evince a clear policy intention to task the judiciary with a more ‘active role 
in shaping the competitive nature of the economy’.85 And if we drill down to the granular level 
to identify the various potential policy factors in favour of the proposition that greater 
consideration should be afforded to the public interest, collective societal and economic 
concerns, what might they be?  Here, a pack of policy rationales for a departure from the 
common law orthodoxy jostle for our attention. The first speaks to the aforementioned anxieties 
                                                 
83 DBEIS, supra note 71, at 3.  
84 Blake, supra note 6, at 687. 
85 Stevens, supra note 82, at 872.  
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about the barriers that non-compete restrictions impose on economic growth and efficiency. It 
has been claimed that the endemic use of restrictive covenants in hiring staff at a macro level, 
‘… slow[s]… down the dissemination of ideas, processes, and methods… and, from the social 
point of view, clog[s] the market's channelling of manpower to employments in which its 
productivity is greatest.’86 The first justification feeds into the second, which is the so-called 
“California Effect”. It is often claimed that by banning non-compete covenants in employment 
contracts in order to promote entrepreneurship, new talent and ideas, start-up companies and 
innovation, the US state of California’s legislature made a major contribution towards the 
emergence of ‘Silicon Valley’ and the enhanced levels of technological innovation, 
advancement and economic success it has experienced over the past forty to fifty years.87 
However, it would be more accurate to say that the Californian State courts will not enforce 
post-termination non-compete restrictions to enable employers to prevent their former 
employees from working for competing companies or businesses that operate in the same 
market.88 In particular, it is contended that the ban on non-compete limitations ensures the ease 
of staff mobility, which contributes towards the free flow of information and expertise across 
firms whose operations are clustered within a small area of California. A ban may also 
incentivise employers to treat their staff well, discourage them from leaving, and raise the bar 
in benefits and pay packages more generally. In essence, the primary arguments for the 
                                                 
86 Blake, supra note 6, at 627.  
87 One of the most prominent scholarly contributions is Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High 
Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U.L. REV. 
575, 577 (1999).  
88 See Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 44 Cal. 4th 937, 950 (2008) and CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 
(West 2011). 
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proscription of non-compete covenants that are derived from the “California Effect” are rooted 
in a commercial rationale. 
It is when we come to the third policy factor that the nature of the bipolar private 
assessment that is involved in the application of the ‘reasonableness’ and ‘legitimate interests’ 
factors and the proportionality review, assumes importance. This is the realisation that by 
balancing the harm to the liberties of the employee against the employer’s need to impose the 
particular covenant to maintain its trade secrets and customer base, the formulation tends to 
disregard the social cost to the public and the economy that would arise if it is enforced. The 
end result is nothing more than a common law mechanism that seeks to prevent distributive 
justice by pursuing an abstentionist policy towards judicial intervention.89 This is so, since the 
existence, but emasculation, of the public interest element of the common law formula arguably 
frustrates redistributive measures and instead limits itself to securing corrective justice between 
the employer and the employee who are the parties to the non-compete covenant. However, 
let’s assume that the public interest thread of the reasonableness test could plausibly be recast 
to empower the courts to focus more on the economic power that the enforcement of the non-
compete covenant would provide to the employer. In such an incarnation of the doctrine of 
restraint of trade, where the court concludes that the resulting market power will likely give 
                                                 
89 Distributive justice is a concept that refers to redistribution of resources away from one party to a relationship 
to another party to the same relationship based on internal considerations relevant to one of those parties or 
external criteria such as efficiency or need, etc: see WILLIAM LUCY, THE PHILOSOPHY OF PRIVATE 
LAW 327ff (2006). Meanwhile, corrective justice is a form of justice that that imposes (a correlative form of) 
liability on a party to a relationship as a result of a set of reasons or justifications relevant and/or applicable to 
that relationship itself, rather than any factors related to one of the parties in particular, such as his/her skills, 
resources, intelligence, which have no bearing on determining whether he/she is liable in law: ERNEST 
WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 3-5, 16-19 & 36 (2016). 
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rise to social costs greater than the private loss incurred by the restrained employee, it would 
be prioritising the redistribution of resources over the correction of private wrongs. 
However, a final, and it is argued, much more material, rationale that can be 
extrapolated from the immediately preceding third policy consideration, but has been 
overlooked to date, is the contribution that post-termination non-compete restrictions make to 
the ability of employers to harness their monopsonistic or oligopsonistic labour market power 
in order to crowd out competitiors and suppress wage levels and outputs.90 Scholarship 
accumulated over the past two decades provides support for the proposition that labour markets 
are more concentrated than was once previously understood.91 This gives rise to monopsonistic 
and oligopsonistic conditions in the labour market where demand is limited to a single acquirer 
(or handful of acquirers) of labour and the available supply invariably consists of an abundance 
of labour.92 Such monopsony or oligopsony arises as a result of a combination of factors, such 
as ‘concentration [in the labour market,]… search frictions, and job differentiation.’93 
Concentrated industries are less competitive with fewer employers offering particular kinds of 
work, either in general terms, or in a particular geographical community. As such, workers are 
                                                 
90 See Ioana Marinescu & Eric A Posner, Why Has Antitrust Law Failed Workers?, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 
1343, 1346 (2020); Suresh Naidu et al., Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market Power, 132 HARV L. REV 536 
(2018) and Ioana Marinescu & Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Mergers in Labor Markets, 94 IND. L.J. 
1031 (2019).  
91 See Jose Azar et al., Labour Market Concentration, NBER Working Paper No. 24147 (2017) 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w24147; Jose Azar et al., Concentration in US Labor Markets: Evidence from 
Online Vacancy Data, 66 LABOUR ECON. 101886 (2020); OECD, Competition in Labour Markets, 
OECD.org (Feb.26 2020), http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/competition-concerns-in-labour-markets.htm 
92 For the theory behind this claim and the evidence in its favour, see Marinescu & Hovenkamp, supra note 90, 
at 1040-1048 and Naidu et al., supra note 90, at 560-569.  
93 See Marinescu & Posner, supra note 90, at 1349. 
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subject to economic forces that naturally dissuade them from quitting their jobs, which 
incentivises employers to act opportunistically, pay below-competitive wages and take liberties 
with their staff and their working conditions. Job differentiation arises because different 
employers offer differing benefits to employees and employees, who then drift towards those 
remuneration packages that align with their preferences. As a result, employees become locked 
into particular packages, which are not always readily portable to new employers, meaning that 
any threats to move jobs fail to convince, again incentivising employers to take advantage of 
this inbuilt reluctance by suppressing wages and diluting working conditions.94 Monopsonistic 
and oligopsonistic market conditions also serve to create frictions to new hirings, negatively 
impacting on the labour market as workers subject to such an environment experience greater 
difficulties in finding new jobs. Employers know this and for that reason are less fearful of 
losing key staff (who have invested specific human capital in the firm) to competing firms 
and/or nervous about paying wages at levels below the equilibrium rate equivalent to their 
marginal product in the labour market.95 And the most crucial point of this discussion is how 
post-employment non-compete covenants amplify the problem of search and mobility frictions 
by enabling employers to “consolidate [and] expand [their] labour market power”.96 They do 
so to the extent that by “… promising not to engage in [competing activities] for five years 
after leaving the employment of firm A, the employee has effectively agreed to [continue to] 
work for firm A or to cease [such activities] for five years”.97 Furthermore, any commercial 
losses generated in reduced productivity attributable to such behaviours that are associated with 
monopsonistic employers are dwarfed by the savings in labour costs flowing from suppressed 
                                                 
94 See id. 1350. 
95 See id. 1349. 
96 Naidu et al., supra note 90, at 560-596.  
97 Rubin & Shedd, supra note 24, at 95. 
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wages.98 This point is significant, since wage stagnation lies at the heart of the rapid decline in 
the labour share of GDP.99 For example, Barkai has articulated the claim that “… the decline 
in the labor share is due to a decline in competition… accompanied by large gaps in output, 
wages, and investment…” He goes on to recommend: “… that without a subsequent increase 
in competition, the labor share will not revert to its previous level.”100  
In the final analysis, what this research about concentrated labour markets and the 
endemic nature of monopsony and oligopsony suggests is that there is indeed a case for the 
reform of the restraint of trade doctrine to drive down the order of magnitude of the 
aforementioned search and mobility frictions.101 It speaks to a policy rationale for legal 
intervention that would set aside a non-compete covenant where the prevalent market 
                                                 
98 See Marinescu & Posner, supra note 90, at 1351 and Carrigan & Radan, supra note 3, at 129.  
99 See Marinescu & Hovenkamp, supra note 90, at 1032; the joint publication by the ILO & OECD, LABOUR 
SHARE IN G20 ECONOMIES 9-10 (2015), https://www.oecd.org/g20/topics/employment-and-social-
policy/The-Labour-Share-in-G20-Economies.pdf; THOMAS PICKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 215-234 (2014); Loukas Karabarbounis & Brent Neiman, The Global Decline of the Labor 
Share, 129 Q.J. ECON. 61 (2014); Simon Deakin et al., How Do Labour Laws Affect Unemployment and the 
Labour Share of National Income? The Experience of Six OECD Countries, 1970–2010, 153 INT’L LAB. REV. 
1 (2014); Engelbert Stockhammer, Determinants of the Wage Share: A Panel Analysis of Advanced and 
Developing Economies, 55 BRIT. J. INDUS REL. 3 (2017); BRANKO MILANOVIC, CAPITALISM, ALONE 
22-27 (2019).  
100 Simcha Barkai, Declining Labor and Capital Shares, 75 J. FIN. 2421, 2457 (2020).  
101 By doing so, wage levels will rise, albeit modestly, which is in the public interest, particularly in the context 
of the post-Covid economic recovery, where the revival will be stimulated in the UK by a consumer demand-led 
growth model, e.g. see Lucio Baccaro & Jonas Pontusson, Rethinking comparative political economy: the 
growth model perspective, 44(2) POL. & SOC’Y 175 (2016) and Scott Lavery, The Legitimation of Post-crisis 
Capitalism in the United Kingdom: Real Wage Decline, Finance-led Growth and the State, 23 NEW 
POLITICAL ECON 27 (2018).   
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conditions and environment dictate that if it were enforced, the economic and social cost 
imposed on society would be higher than the individual economic loss and harm sustained by 
the employee restrained in terms of the denial of his/her liberties. Research indicates that such 
conditions may well arise in non-competitive labour markets for the reason that the search and 
mobility frictions not only cause harms to the employees, but also the public. That is the case 
because the restrictive covenant acts as a natural deterrent to new firms who would otherwise 
have entered into the market to compete with the employer by offering higher wages and better 
conditions to employees and by lowering the prices for goods and services charged to 
consumers: if they cannot access any staff, they will set up their business elsewhere.102 
Economic research into monopsony indicates that although monopsonistic employers extract 
suppressed input prices from their suppliers (including labour) and as such, enjoy lower input 
costs, this does not translate into lower output prices charged to the consumers of their products 
or services. In fact, the common effect is for output prices to rise. In this way, by deterring new 
firms from entering the marketplace, measures such as restrictive covenants that serve to 
heighten search and mobility frictions, ought to be tackled, less overall welfare in the economy 
be allowed to deteriorate. In essence, there is a category error inherent within the restraint of 
trade doctrine inasmuch as it equates the social cost to the public of enforcing a covenant with 
the private cost and loss sustained by the employee restrained. Instead, where there is 
monopsony, the endemic use of restrictive covenants by an employer will result in a disjuncture 
between this social and private cost. As such, there are clearly social and economic costs 
imposed by the failure of the ‘reasonableness’ criterion in the restraint of trade doctrine to 
consider the broader distributional impacts in upholding a covenant where it is ruled not to 
have infringed on the liberty of an employee to trade. 
                                                 
102 For a discussion, see ROGER BLAIR & JEFFREY HARRISON, MONOPSONY IN LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 43-48 and 53-67 (2010). 
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If we turn to consider the potential shape of those reforms, here we can evoke two 
specific frameworks, the first of which entails a more intensive level of intervention, and the 
second a less heightened one. And both of these can be referred to as the “thick” and “thin” 
incarnations of reform. The first “thick” variety is the most extreme option, entailing an 
outright ban on non-compete covenants on the ground that they give rise to policy concerns 
oriented around monopsony and oligopsony in labour markets and counter the possibility of a 
California effect. And as noted above, this is one of the UK Government’s options for reform 
of the common law restraint of trade doctrine. However, it is the second “thin” model that is 
the least intrusive. It provides that in determining the validity of a covenant, its broader 
distributional impacts ought to be given greater prominence and at least as much as the private 
loss or harm to the employee. This would entail a heightened degree of value attributed to the 
interests of the public, wider society and the economy, which would operate in tandem with 
the traditional concerns for the employee’s liberties to compete, trade and mobility to press 
down on the covenant. In essence, it would involve proper application of the public interest 
strand of the ‘reasonableness’ criterion in the restraint of trade doctrine.  
The author harbours a strong preference for the “thin” over the “thick” model of reform. 
And the justifications for this position are rooted in a mixture of policy and practicalities. First, 
the “thin” variable represents a much less extreme package of reforms, as a comprehensive ban 
would arguably cause disproportionate harm, by imposing all sorts of illegitimate adverse 
economic impacts on the property rights of employers who are operating in competitive labour 
markets. Secondly, whilst conceivably it would be consistent with concerns about monopsony 
power, an outright ban on restrictive covenants would provoke a great deal of resistance for 
more practical reasons. Such clauses simply would be replaced by garden leave clauses.103 For 
                                                 
103 A “garden leave” clause is a provision in an employment contract that instructs an employee to stay at home 
and not perform work in return for wages which operates in “circumstances where either the employer or (more 
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that reason, the approach of conferring more prominence to the public interest test is sound as 
a policy consideration and a more pragmatic compromise. 
There are a range of objections to the proposed “thin” reform which prefers the 
enhancement of the role for the public interest thread of the ‘reasonableness’ test in addressing 
the enforceability of restrictive covenants. The first resides in the purpose of contract law as a 
field of enquiry. It is traditionally treated as an area predicated on the expression of freedom to 
and of contract on the part of individuals. In general, it shuns public policy measures of a 
mandatory nature or consideration of the public interest in interpreting and applying the terms 
of the parties’ agreement. However, this line of argument fails to account for the fact that the 
restraint of trade doctrine is itself rooted in public policy, which is a specific area of contract 
law that avowedly prefers mandatory rules over private ordering. It also overlooks the reality 
that the law governing the employment contract is inherently couched in terms of policy 
considerations. As noted by Lord Sumption in Société Générale (London Branch) v Geys:104 
                                                 
often) the employee gives notice but the employer does not want the employee to attend work during the notice 
period… [and] does not want the employee to work for a competitor during that period…”: Christie v Johnston 
Carmichael [2010] IRLR 1016 (EAT) [38] (Lady Smith) (Scot.). In form, garden leave clauses differ from non-
compete covenants, but their consequences for the employee, in substance, are more or less identical. 
104 [2012] UKSC 63, [2013] 1 AC 523, 567 (Lord Sumption) (appeal taken from EWCA (Civ)). See also another 
Justice of the UK Supreme Court, Lord Kerr, in his judgment in a case called Gisda Cyf v Barratt [2010] UKSC 
41, [2010] 4 All ER 851 [37]-[39] (appeal taken from EWCA (Civ)). For a penetrating analysis of the public and 
private dimensions of labour law rules, see CYNTHIA ESTLUND, The Fall and Rise of the Private Law of 
Work, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PRIVATE LAW THEORY 412 (Hanoch Dagan & Benjamin C. 
Zipursky eds., 2020) and ADITI BAGCHI, The Employment Relationship as an Object of Employment Law, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE NEW PRIVATE LAW 361 (Andrew S. Gold, John C. P. Goldberg, 
Daniel B. Kelly & Henry E. Smith eds., 2021).  
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 ‘… contracts of employment are governed by the same principles as other contracts, 
except in those cases where their subject matter gives rise to compelling policy 
considerations calling for a different approach… the relationship of employer and 
employee is especially liable to give rise to policy considerations of this kind, because 
its incidents have significant social and economic implications.’ 
A second objection to the proposed re-calibration of the law (that would place greater 
pressure on the public interest in the reasonableness test and consideration of the employer’s 
market power) is that an area of labour law – the restraint of trade doctrine – would be treading 
on territory traditionally regulated by anti-trust/competition law. Indeed, it might be claimed 
with some credibility that not only would there be unnecessary duplication, but also that anti-
trust/competition law is much better placed to undertake such assessments of economic power 
dynamics. In colloquial terms, labour law should simply back off. However, neither is this 
argument particularly persuasive. First, the existence of concurrent liability in contract law and 
anti-trust/competition law would be nothing unusual. For example, the performance of the 
contract of employment is governed by the law of contract, the law of tort and also by employer 
duties enshrined in legislation. To that extent, an employer may contravene the law governing 
the employment contract where it breaches contract law, commits a tort, or breaches a statutory 
duty. And this is so routine that it is generally treated as unremarkable. Secondly, the proposed 
‘thin’ adjustment of the doctrine of restraint of trade in this article (towards greater recognition 
and evaluation of market-centred dynamics in terms of the public interest limb of the 
‘reasonableness’ test) is sufficiently modest that its primary objective of upholding the personal 
liberty of the covenantor could continue to be cited as the means by which it is to be 
differentiated from the economic-oriented goals of anti-trust/competition law.105 For example, 
                                                 
105 See Mary Lucey, Safeguarding the Restraint of Trade Doctrine from EU Competition Law: Identifying the 
threat and Proposing Solutions, 52 IRISH JURIST 115 (2014) and MARY LUCEY, Restraint of Trade 
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were the doctrine to be reformed in this way, both labour law and anti-trust/competition law 
would continue to perform completely different functions: an employee would continue to have 
no automatic right to table economic or market data indicating that the employer benefits from 
monopsony – thus justifying recourse to the public interest limb of the reasonableness test – 
unless the courts were first persuaded by data presented by the employee that the labour market 
(in which the employer operates) was concentrated and uncompetitive. In contrast, assessments 
of the economic power wielded by the employer in the labour market, would be possible as a 
matter of course under anti-trust and competition law cases. In the final analysis, it could not 
be presupposed that both of the legal techniques applied under labour law and anti-
trust/competition law would be designed to achieve the same objectives, since a crucial role 
for the bipolar private interests and freedoms of the parties would be retained and secured in 
the case of the restraint of trade doctrine. In addition, an enhanced role for the doctrine in 
articulating when the public interest would be muzzled by a restrictive covenant should be 
embraced, given the inherent flexibility of the techniques involved in its application, which are 
perhaps lacking in anti-trust/competition law cases. 
A third counterargument is animated by a concern for cost, time, resources and 
efficiencies in the administration of justice in the courts. The anxiety is that adding teeth to the 
public interest thread of the ‘reasonableness’ test of the restraint of trade doctrine would 
increase uncertainty for businesses, since it would introduce higher levels of legal complexity 
into the equation. The consequence is unpredictability in terms of the effects on the scarce 
resources of the court system, which is often referred to as the risk that the “floodgates” are 
opened to litigation, i.e. “the fear of an unreasonable imposition of liability on too great a scale 
                                                 
Doctrine: A Traditional Tool Fit for the Modern Economy?, in ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF PROFESSOR JILL 
POOLE: COHERENCE, MODERNISATION AND INTEGRATION IN CONTRACT, COMMERCIAL AND 
CORPORATE LAWS 164 (Rob Merkin & James Devenney eds., 2018). 
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to be tolerable”.106 However, concrete empirical evidence has never been presented to 
substantiate this anxiety.107 Nor is there any reason of principle why the modification of a legal 
rule should be rejected to deny a remedy simply because it would be beneficial to the many 
instead of the few.108 For these reasons, it has been claimed by the judiciary that the floodgates 
argument is “greatly exaggerated”.109 This leads to the conclusion that there is scant 
justification to be fearful about the proposed reform since it represents a modest adjustment of 
an existing rule, amounting to nothing more than a “controlled opening of the gates, permitting 
the flooding of a [carefully prescribed] area, rather than a wholesale inundation of 
unforeseeable and uncontrolled proportions”.110 
Finally, it is often argued that because judges are not economists, the law should not be 
shaped in a direction that compels them to assess levels of market power.111 Whilst that might 
be so, the law does expect the judiciary to adjudicate disputes of a profoundly economic bent 
in the case of anti-trust/competition law. For example, consider the decisions of the UK 
Supreme Court in Mastercard Inc v Merricks CBE and of the High Court in England in Britned 
Development Ltd. v ABB AB.112 In both cases, the judiciary engaged in extensive and complex 
                                                 
106 Leigh & Sullivan Ltd. v the Aliakmon Ltd. [1985] 1 QB 350, 393 (Lord Justice Goff). 
107 See MAURO BUSSANI & VERNON PALMER, The Notion of Pure Economic Loss and Its Setting, in 
PURE ECONOMIC LOSS IN EUROPE 18 (Mauro Bussani & Vernon Palmer eds., 2003). 
108 Junior Books Ltd. v Veitchi Co. Ltd. [1983] 1 AC 520, 539 (Lord Roskill). 
109 See McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983] 1 AC 410, 442 (Lord Bridge). 
110 Leigh & Sullivan Ltd. v the Aliakmon Ltd. [1985] 1 QB 350, 393 (Lord Justice Goff). 
111 For a critique of the ability of the judiciary and the law to make economic judgments, as well as the general 
failure of judges to make economic calculations in their reasoning, see ERNEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF 
PRIVATE LAW 14-18 (1995), STEPHEN SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 132-136 (2007) and JONATHAN 
MORGAN, CONTRACT LAW MINIMALISM 43-60 (2013). 
112 [2020] UKSC 51, [2021] Bus. L.R. 25 and [2018] EWHC 2616 (Ch), [2019] Bus. L.R. 718. 
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economic calculations and analysis. To that extent, senior judges are already familiar with the 
techniques that are necessary to calculate economic power in particular markets and sectors of 
the economy, and how an employer’s situation fits within that environment. As such, the claim 
that the law should not expect judges to act as economists in dispute resolution is as much 
unconvincing as it is uncompelling. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This article promotes the reform of the common law restraint of trade doctrine in English Law 
so that its abiding concern for the individual liberties of employees who are subjected to post-
termination covenants are relegated to a marginal degree, with a corresponding heightening in 
the recognition it affords to public concerns. Although such a package of reform is ironic and 
perhaps a reversal of Victorian priorities on the protection of liberties, it resonates with 
Governmental anxieties about the wider economic effects of the common law that are gaining 
currency in policy circles, as well as their diagnosis of the problems that it can generate. 
Although a welcome addition to the debate surrounding the common law, the UK 
Government’s prescriptions for reform are perhaps slightly wide of the mark when considered 
in light of its useful diagnosis. The question is how the challenge posed to society, the public 
and the economy by the common law and its myopic attitude towards the existence of search 
frictions in monopsonistic and concentrated labour markets that are caused by restrictive 
covenants can best be addressed. The solution presented by this article is for the common law 
tests to be specifically adapted by the judiciary or legislation to enable the courts to look beyond 
the private costs imposed by the covenants on the employee, so that more market-oriented 
factors are accounted for. And the claim is made that the failure of the common law restraint 
of trade doctrine to account for an employer’s labour market power in weighing up the case for 
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and against the validity of a non-compete covenant is no longer tenable in light of recent 
research findings on the ubiquity and nature of employer monopsony. 
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